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testimony. Multiplying these numbers gives you a number greater
than 20,000. (Koppl 2010c, p. 222)

It has been estimated that in the United States there are
20,000 false felony convictions a year due to deficiencies in the
forensic science and criminal justice systems (Koppl, 2010c).
As many of these errors can be attributed to flaws in the processes
by which forensic science decisions are made, the principles of procedural justice are a useful lens for analyzing these processes and
recommending improved practices. In this secondary analysis of
current research, decision-making processes in forensic sciences
are analyzed using Leventhal’s six criteria for establishing procedural justice. Specifically, we assesses the current state of forensic
science, explain how some industry practices may be prone to error
and bias, and provide practical suggestions for improving industry
practices to better adhere to the principles of procedural justice.
In addition, the implications of this analysis for practitioners outside of forensic sciences are discussed. Organization Management
Journal, 10: 99–109, 2013. doi: 10.1080/15416518.2013.801743

In making this estimate, Koppl treated Risinger’s estimate as
a conservative benchmark for the global rate of false felony
convictions in the United States.
In both the United States and the United Kingdom there is
increasing awareness that there may be a relatively large number of FS errors each year and that significant change may be
desirable. Increasing awareness of FS errors in the United States
led Congress to commission a study of FS and its needs. The
study (NAS, 2009) identified some important vulnerabilities of
the system and made specific recommendations for significant
change. The Forensic Regulator in the United Kingdom seems
to moving in a similar direction in the wake of the revelation
of significant forensic-science errors such as the false fingerprint identifications in the cases of Shirley McKie (McBeth,
2004; McDougall, 2006) and of Peter Kenneth Smith (Smith,
R. v [2011] EWCA Crim 1296 (24 May 2011)). Thus, in both
the United States and the United Kingdom, there seems to be a
climate for change in FS.
FS errors have been examined from both economic and
psychological perspectives. The economic approach to analyzing FS has elucidated how systemic flaws lead to errors.
In particular, Koppl (2010a) explains (a) that despite the illusion
of precise technology and scientific testing, most evidence is
decided upon based on the subjective judgment of forensics
professionals, (b) that forensic labs are often dependent upon
law-enforcement agencies for funding and oversight, (c) that
evidence usually goes to one lab only, giving that lab monopoly
status that reduces the chance to catch and correct errors, and (d)
that the use of objective performance criteria for law enforcement rewards the number of convictions rather than correct
verdicts. All of these structural defects create a bias toward finding guilt and, therefore, toward the risk of error. This bias seems
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, the notion that
one should err on the side of preventing false convictions, even
if this means some guilty persons are exonerated.

Keywords organizational justice; procedural justice; forensic
science; decision-making processes; industry-specific
research

INTRODUCTION
The Forensic Science Industry
Research has demonstrated that flaws in the forensic science
(FS) and criminal justice systems lead to errors in how forensic
testing is conducted and how its results are interpreted.1 As a
result, it has been estimated that, in the United States, there are
20,000 false felony convictions a year due to these system-based
errors:
There are over one million felony convictions per year. Risinger
(2007) has established that the “minimum factual wrongful conviction rate” for capital rape-murders from 1982 through 1989 is at least
3.3% (pp. 768 & 778). The study of Saks and Koehler (2005) suggests that about two thirds of false convictions arise in part from
forensic science testing errors or false or misleading forensic science
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From a psychological standpoint, Risinger et al. (2002)
and Dror et al. (2005) discuss how FS errors may be created
by decision-making biases such as selection bias and confirmation bias, as well as the relationships and communication
between forensic labs and law-enforcement agencies. Helsoot
and Groenedall (2011) take a different, though complementary,
approach by studying the decision-making processes of forensic
researchers.
In both the economic and psychological approaches to
forensic-science error, researchers are not criticizing individual
forensic scientists. Researchers are instead seeking beneficial
changes in the context of forensic-science decision making.
In this article, we bring ideas from the domain of organizational
behavior, an interdisciplinary area of study that uses a blend
of psychological, sociological, economic, and anthropological
concepts and focuses them on understanding how individuals,
groups, and whole systems behave in organizational settings.
By doing so, we add to the discussion of how to improve FS,
both in furthering understanding of the current problems in FS
and in the search for positive change.
Purpose of This Study
This study uses procedural justice, a central topic in organizational behavior research, as a lens to assess common practices
in FS. Specifically, the major criteria of procedural justice in
organizations, as developed by Leventhal (1980), are applied to
forensics science as it is commonly practiced in the criminal justice system. In this way we can better assesses the current state
of FS, explain how some industry practices may be prone to
error and bias, and provide practical suggestions for improving
industry practices to better adhere to the principles of procedural
justice.
We believe the industry-specific focus of this article does not
mean it is relevant only to those in FS. In this article, we hope
not only to advance practice in FS, but to help practitioners and
researchers in many management fields better understand the
implications of making procedural justice a more central feature in their decision making. The lessons we draw from the
FS industry can be applied to many industries and business
organizations. Further, explicitly examining procedural justice
in a specific industry context allows organizational scholars to
consider the generalizability, applicability, and limiting factors
of this classic organizational behavior (OB) theory—leading to
potential new avenues for research and application (see Aguinis
& Pierce, 2008; Cascio, 2008; Rousseau & Fried, 2001).
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
When making decisions that involve important consequences
for individuals and groups, it is important that decision-making
processes are perceived to be equitable by affected parties
(Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). As a result, organizational behavior researchers have extensively studied fairness
in decision making and identified four major components of

organizational justice: distributive (based on outcomes relative
to employee contributions), procedural (based on the fairness
of decision-making processes), interpersonal (based on how
one is personally treated), and informational (based on databased explanation of decisions) (Behson, 2011; Colquitt, 2001;
Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). There is considerable evidence
that, despite some conceptual and measurement overlap, these
dimensions of justice are valid, distinct but interrelated, and
useful to managers in improving decision-making accuracy and
acceptance, as well as influencing a wide range of employee
reactions (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005).
Of the four dimensions of justice, procedural justice is seen
by many as particularly important for managers, as managers
can often exert considerable control over the decision-making
process (Cropanzano et al., 2007). Further, procedural justice
is particularly important in shaping employee reactions to both
decisions, as well as the larger system in which decisions are
made (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007; Behson, 2011). For
example, while the amount of bonus one receives is important,
the knowledge that bonuses were distributed in a fair manner also affects employees’ perceptions of the supervisors and
decision-making processes involved, as well as of the overall
organization.
These assessments may lead employees to either increase
or decrease their job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
and the level of trust they have in decision makers (Moorman
& Byrne, 2005). In turn, these reactions may influence such
behaviors as performance, counterproductive behaviors, citizenship behaviors, withdrawal, retaliation, reciprocation, and
turnover (e.g., Conlan, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005). Some
research has also linked procedural justice to the frequency
of lawsuits, employee theft, sabotage, and aggressive behavior (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2007). Finally, procedural justice
is seen as particularly important in situations in which one does
not receive an expected positive outcome, as procedural justice
moderates the resulting negative reactions, making them less
extreme (Brockner, 2010).
In his seminal study on procedural justice, Leventhal (1980)
proposed the following criteria as essential for establishing just
processes: (a) consistency of decision making, (b) freedom from
bias, (c) basing decisions on accurate information, (d) the ability to correct flawed decisions, (e) conformity with prevailing
morals, and (f) consideration of the opinions of those affected
by decisions. Each of these criteria is distinct, although there is
some overlap. For example, the use of a consistent process for
decision making also reduces the chance of biased decisions and
makes it easier to reassess or correct flawed decisions. While
Leventhal and other justice researchers are primarily concerned
with internal decisions affecting employees, such as compensation, promotions, and performance evaluations, this lens was
initially adapted from a legal context, and seems particularly
relevant to decision making in FS organizations.
This article discusses each of Leventhal’s criteria, provides
examples of their typical applications in business organizations,
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and assesses the current state of FS practice on each procedural
justice criterion. Finally, the principles of procedural justice are
used to recommend how FS practice may be improved in order
to create a more fair and accurate system.
Criterion 1—Consistency of Decision-Making
This criterion is focused on ensuring consistency of decisionmaking rules over time and across individuals. Just processes
use similar criteria regardless of who is being evaluated, and
these criteria should remain relatively constant over time. In this
way, affected parties will better understand the basis by which
they were evaluated and know that the same rules applied to all.
One example of an organizational decision-making process that
adheres to this criterion is the use of structured interviews and
multiple raters during a hiring process, so that each applicant is
asked the same set of questions and consistency among raters
can be measured. These lead to less biased, more valid, and
more legally defensible decisions, and also result in more positive applicant reactions (McCarthy, Van Iddekinge, & Campion,
2010). Employment laws regarding disparate treatment, comparable worth, and pay equity also exemplify concern for this
criterion. Another related notion is ensuring that processes are
not changed too often and that changes to a decision-making
process are explained ahead of time (Cropanzano et al., 2007).
Consistency is also valued in FS. Crime labs have scientific protocols to which forensic scientists express allegiance.
Those protocols, however, generally permit forensic scientists
to exercise discretion and subjective judgment. Discretion and
consistency may not be fully compatible principles. Helsloot
and Groenendaal (2011), Dror et al. (2005), and Whitman and
Koppl (2010) all note that the norms and values of the decision makers influence their decisions. For example, the amount
of time forensic researchers would like to spend on a murder
case may depend on whether the victim is a child or a convicted
felon.
A study by the National Academies of Science (NAS, 2009)
notes that many forensic disciplines, including traditional hair
microscopy, handwriting comparison, bloodstain pattern analysis, fingerprint examinations, impression evidence (such as
shoeprints and tire tracks), and toolmarks and firearms identification (commonly called “ballistics”), rely on subjective judgment (NAS, 2009). Thompson (2009) and Dror and Hampikian
(2011) show that even DNA anaylsis often relies on subjective judgment. It may be surprising that fingerprint examination
and DNA analysis are often subjective. Subjective judgment
is an important element in fingerprint examinations when the
“latent” print lifted from a crime scene is smudged, partial,
lifted from an irregular surface, or overlain by other prints
or marks (Thompson & Cole, 2004). Subjective judgment is
also involved in DNA analysis when the crime-scene sample
is small, contaminated, degraded, or is a mixture derived from
two or more persons (Thompson & Cole, 2004).
Dror and Charlton (2006) provide experimental evidence of a
lack of consistency in fingerprint examinations. They found that
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12% of examiners reversed their original decisions when given
the same evidence at two different times. Dror and Hampikian
(2011) presented DNA evidence to 17 DNA analysts, but with
the case information stripped away. Twelve judged that the suspects could be excluded, four found the evidence inconclusive,
and one found evidence implicating the suspect. This result
suggests that forensic DNA analysis may lack consistency.
Nichols (2007) vigorously defends subjective judgment in
firearms and toolmark identification. Thus, by some in the
industry, subjectivity is seen not as a flaw to be minimized, but
rather an important feature of FS.
Criterion 2—Freedom From Bias
One focus of this criterion is ensuring that self-interest is
removed from a decision-making process. In this way, bias is
lessened by removing conflicts of interest and the possibility
that decision makers can give themselves an advantage or undue
benefit. Following this criterion often means that decision makers must recuse themselves from certain decisions that may
affect them or their constituencies.
Other ways to conform to this criterion include making conflicts of interest known and having multiple people involved in
making decisions. For example, executives do not set their own
compensation; pay packages are commonly developed by the
compensation committee of the board of directors, often with
assistance from an outside consultancy. Many companies have
strict romance and nepotism policies and do not allow romantically involved couples or family members to directly supervise
or control outcomes for those with whom they have a personal
relationship (Lickey, Berry, & Whelan-Berry, 2009). In addition, the possibility of bias is one of the cited disadvantages
of 360-degree performance reviews, as employees may have an
incentive to overrate themselves and underrate their coworkers
(Morgeson, Mumford, & Campion, 2005).
Further, this criterion involves addressing decisionmaking biases, such as halo effects and confirmation bias
(Jonas, Schultz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelan, 2001), often through
anonymization. For example, research into employee selection
has noted bias against resumés that contain unconventional
or ethnic names and against interviewees who speak with
certain foreign accents (Hosoda & Stone-Romero, 2010;
Mullainathan & Bertrand, 2004). By stripping resumés of
names and indentifying information before passing them along
to decision makers, and by using structured interviews and
rating scales, one can eliminate much of this bias. Even some
education researchers suggest that teachers should anonymize
before grading student work to reduce the effect of biasing
information (Walvoord & Anderson, 2009).
Bias is now a recognized problem in FS, although there is
disagreement as to how much of a problem it presents. There are
several causes of potential bias in FS, including its relationship
to law enforcement and the role of context information.
The National Academies study notes, “The majority
of forensic science laboratories are administered by law
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enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the
laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency”
(NAS, 2009, p. 6-1). Dependence on law enforcement for budgets, resources, or personal advancement creates a risk of bias.
“Forensic scientists who sit administratively in law enforcement
agencies or prosecutors’ offices, or who are hired by those units,
are subject to a general risk of bias” (NAS, 2009, p. 6-2). Much
of this biasing pressure is likely to be subtle rather than overt,
but it still may exert influence (Yukl & Tracey, 1992).
Context information in FS is information about the circumstances of the crime or underlying event. Some context
information, such as the criminal history of the suspect, may be
extraneous to the scientific analysis of physical evidence. Other
context information, such as the genetic profile of the suspect,
may be relevant but potentially biasing (Risinger et al., 2002,
Krane et al., 2008).
Risinger et al. (2002, p. 37) gives an example of potentially biasing context information drawn from lab notes in a
real case. “Suspect-known crip gang member—keeps ‘skating’
on charges—never serves time. This robbery he gets hit in
head with bar stool—left blood trail. [Detective] Miller wants
to connect this guy to scene w/DNA.” In another case an
examiner writes, “Death penalty case! Need to eliminate Item
#57 [name of individual] as a possible suspect” (Krane, 2008).
Such context information has the potential to skew the results
of a forensic examination, particularly under the frequently
encountered condition of ambiguous evidence.
Masking is the most basic strategy for minimizing the
biasing potential of context information. Rosenthal (1978,
p.1007) enjoins us to “keep the processes of data collection and
analysis as blind a possible for as long as possible.” Risinger
et al. (2002) have an excellent discussion of bias and masking. Krane et al. (2008) outline a protocol called “sequential
unmasking” for applying the principle of masking to forensic
DNA analysis. Unfortunately, we do not know of any public crime lab that has adopted sequential unmasking or similar
protections against bias by context information.
Criterion 3—Basing Decisions on Accurate Information
This criterion is focused on use of information that is correct, can be verified, and is not overly subjective. Objective data
are favored over subjective data, and one should use reliable
data and informed opinion when making decisions (Leventhal,
1980). Decision makers must be competent, and should be held
responsible for making good decisions and keeping records
about the decision-making process.
In business, this criterion is adhered to with such practices as
management by objectives (MBO), goal setting, and the use of
objective performance standards during performance reviews.
The use of multiple independent raters is also important for
this criterion. Further, managers need to be fully trained and
knowledgeable so that they can use information wisely. Finally,
the results of decision-making processes need to be continually
assessed to determine whether decision makers are doing their

jobs well. In this way, supervisors who are not conducting
thorough and objective performance reviews can be sent for
training or otherwise held accountable.
The need for accurate information has two aspects. First, the
information presented to forensic scientists should be accurate.
Subjective protocols are not entirely consistent with this criterion because the subjectively perceived degree of similarity
between two patterns is not always accurate, particularly when
it can be influenced or distorted by context. Second, good record
keeping is important. In addition, FS practice does not always
include good record keeping; this fact compounds the problems
associated with subjectivity, interrater variance, and bias.
One example of problematic record keeping is provided
by an official report by the Justice Department’s Office of
the Inspector General (OIG, 1997) on the explosives section
of the FBI crime lab. This report shows that a forensic scientist consistently failed to document the tests he performed
before testifying in federal cases. Further, an FBI audit of the
Houston Crime Lab (FBI Director, 2002) provides copious evidence of multiple serious errors and inadequacies, including
the mixing of different types of evidence in a central screening area, a leaking roof that dripped on evidence, improper
sealing of evidence in storage freezers, technicians not wearing proper gloves and lab coats, improperly calibrated instruments, improper documentation of equipment maintenance,
minimal note-taking, sloppy and incomplete lab reports, inconsistent cleaning procedures, and even inadequately educated and
trained staff.
Accurate information can be difficult or impossible to obtain
when files are difficult to access (Gold, 2008) or forensic evidence is destroyed (Greene & Moffeit, 2007). Greene and
Moffeit (2007) found cases of 141 prisoners in different states
“whose bids for freedom [through exoneration] have stalled
because officials lost or destroyed DNA.”
Criterion 4—The Ability to Correct Flawed Decisions
This criterion is focused on the ability for those affected by
a decision to have their case reviewed and checked for errors
in both process and outcome. This often involves creating and
implementing proper grievance procedures that may involve
third parties or skipping a part of the chain of command (i.e.,
removing initial decider from the appeal). One should be able
to review the information used at various stages of the process, as well as various elements of the process, such as rater
selection, criteria, and consistent application of decision rules.
Organizational sexual harassment policies adhere to this principle by requiring companies to set up grievance procedures run
by someone outside of the chain of command of those involved,
such as a designated human resources (HR) professional or an
outside arbiter (Steingold, 2011).
Forensic-science errors are often difficult to correct. In addition to the risk of evidence destruction noted earlier, some
forensic tests including DNA analysis “consume” a portion of
the evidence. If the quantity of evidence is low, testing may
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consume all of it. If evidence has been consumed or destroyed,
any analytic error will be hard to correct.
The organization of FS also increases the difficulty of correcting errors. FS today is characterized by a twofold monopoly.
First, evidence is typically examined by one crime lab only
(NAS 2009; Giannelli, 2004). In this sense, the crime lab
receiving evidence has a monopoly on examination of that evidence. Second, that same lab will normally be the only one
to offer an interpretation of the results of the examination it
performs. The current process does not commonly produce multiple examinations by defense experts or independent experts
(Thompson, 1995). Noting this fact, the National Academies
report says, “Prosecutors usually have an advantage over most
defendants in offering expert testimony in criminal cases”
(NAS, 2009, p. S-8). Giannelli (2004) finds that the defense’s
right to expert assistance recognized by the Supreme Court
in the 1985 case Ake v. Oklahoma “has not been effectively
implemented” (p. 1419). Monopoly in examination and interpretation may allow errors, false interpretations, or even fraud to
go undetected and unchallenged, leaving alternative hypotheses
unexamined.
Thompson and Dioso-Villa (2008) examined the case of
Robin Lovitt, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in Virginia. They note problems with the crucial DNA
evidence and explain how various attempts for a new trial
have failed. “Whether Lovitt is actually guilty or not can be
debated, but it seems quite clear that his trial was unfair. Close
examination of this case suggests that we have a trial system where scientific findings can be misrepresented. Perhaps
equally important, it shows us that our system of appellate and
habeas review can fail to recognize these problems” (p. 142).
Though Governor Warner commuted his sentence to life imprisonment, Lovitt has not been released or exonerated, illustrating
the difficulty in getting even unambiguous errors corrected.

Criterion 5—Conformity With Prevailing Morals
This criterion involves ensuring that procedures are made
in accordance with precedent, law, and cultural standards.
Elements such as deception, privacy violations, bribery, and
spying would generally run afoul of this criterion. In businesses,
this may also involve ensuring that processes are consistent with
organizational culture and norms.
For example, employers are usually within their rights to
monitor employee e-mails and telephone communications in
the workplace, as well as to conduct searches and surveillance on company property (Steingold, 2011). While legal
under most circumstances, however, extensive and indiscriminant use of these practices is generally seen as a violation of
societal norms regarding expectations of privacy. As a result,
most organizations do not comprehensively monitor employees without extensive warning, and those that do often limit
such surveillance to very specific circumstances (e.g., after evidence of employee theft) (Repa, 2005). Further, differences
in national and corporate policy regarding parental leave and
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family-friendly human resource practices can often be attributed
to the degree to which a culture’s prevailing norms are aligned
with work–family balance. Thus, countries like Norway and
Denmark offer up to a full year of paid parental leave, while
the United States only requires 12 weeks of unpaid leave
(Henderson & White, 2004).
One dimension of prevailing morals that is of paramount
importance to FS is the standard of presumptive innocence. That
is, as a moral viewpoint, suspects should be presumed innocent, and treated as such, until guilt can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some FS practices seem to compromise this
viewpoint. For instance, FBI fingerprint expert Bruce Budowle
and his co-authors (2006) report, “A latent print examiner tends
to approach the comparison to ‘make an ident[ification],’ rather
than to attempt to exclude.”
The case of Kirk Turner is an example of how the
moral principle of a presumption of innocence was compromised by the actions of forensic scientists. The scientists’ initial examination of evidence seemed not to implicate Mr. Turner and was consistent with his claim of selfdefense (Neff, 2010a, 2010b). However, after meeting with
prosecutors, the scientists conducted a series of experiments
designed to support the prosecution’s case for murder charges,
These experiments were captured on video (some footage can
be seen at http://www.newsobserver.com/videos/?media_id=
17182298) and were aimed at proving the prosecution’s theory
instead of at making an evenhanded determination of what the
physical evidence revealed.
In addition, the verification procedures for fingerprint examination might also compromise the presumption of innocence.
Fingerprint examiners in the United States use the “ACEV” methodology, consisting of four stages: analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification (SWGFAST, 2006). The
last stage applies if the examiner believes that the known
and unknown fingerprints match. In that case the examiner
seeks out another qualified examiner to verify the initial
identification.
As verification is only sought after a match, the second examiner knows that a match has been made, potentially biasing her
or his judgment. Further, the current guidelines for fingerprint
analysts do not prohibit verification shopping, whereby a failure
of verification may be ignored and another, more favorable, verification sought. Guidelines give responsibility and authority to
individual agencies to review situations in which initial identifications are not verified and to decide whether documentation or
corrective action is needed. Such loose policy and self-policing
leave open the possibility of bias toward confirming guilt rather
than exploring all possible avenues of innocence (Cole, 2005;
Dror et al., 2006; OIG, 2006). Indeed, there are at least two
documented cases in which verification shopping seems to have
been tolerated as a matter of policy.
In 2007, in Seminole County, Florida, a whistleblower
who is a latent fingerprint examiner issued a memo accusing her coworker of misbehavior and incompetence (Stutzman
2007a, 2007b; Williamson 2007). She reported that, after two
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nonconfirming attempts at verification, her coworker sent the
print in question to a retired fingerprint examiner whom the
whistleblower considered incompetent. The complaint focused
on her colleague seeking verification from someone who
was not competent. While verification shopping also clearly
occurred, the whisteblower made no objection to it, indicating
that verification shopping may be an accepted practice, deemed
legitimate even by whistleblowers.
The second case comes from an official report on the case of
Brandon Mayfield, whom the FBI mistakenly identified as the
source of a print left at the scene of the Madrid train bombing.
The [FBI’s Latent Print Unit (LPU)] Quality Assurance Manual
provided that if the second examiner reached a different conclusion,
the matter “must be referred to the supervisor and/or the Unit Chief
for resolution” . . . One option available to the supervisor was to
select another verifier if the first verifier declined to confirm the
identification. In that instance, there was no policy requiring that the
first verifier’s disagreement be documented in the case file. (OIG,
2006, p. 115)

The report does not suggest that there was verification shopping
in the Mayfield case. But it does reveal that it was considered
legitimate procedure to shop for positive verifications.
Criterion 6—Consideration of the Opinions of Affected
Parties
This criterion includes such considerations as participation, voice, and consent. Before a decision-making process is
designed and implemented, those involved should make sure
that opinions over a wide range, including dissenting ones, are
heard. For example, during strategic planning, decision makers should make an effort to get input from a wide variety
of employees, from many levels and departments (Cropanzano
et al., 2007). Many organizations set up representative bodies,
focus groups, or task forces for this purpose. By the organizations doing so, those affected by the decision will better
understand the decisions that are made and are less likely to feel
that the process did not consider their views. This criterion also
encourages a broad definition of stakeholders and constituents.
Another organizational application of this criterion is
employee participation in performance evaluations, whereby
employees self-assess and then discuss their ratings with their
supervisors. Finally, having an employee and supervisor jointly
set performance goals generally leads to more acceptance and
commitment to goals, and to better performance and job satisfaction (Locke & Latham, 2002).
We previously noted that forensics labs are generally organized under law enforcement agencies. This governance structure reduces the voice of other participants in the criminal
justice system, especially public defenders and other defense
attorneys. In some cases, public defenders have difficulty gaining access to state crime labs and forensic scientists. Further,
the FBI has so far refused to release anonymized data from
its large criminal DNA data set. This policy prevents both
disinterested scientists and defense experts from studying the

data for patterns, anomalies, and suggested improvements to the
FS process. Krane et al. (2009) call on the FBI to give qualified
researchers greater access to this data.
Cowan (2012) argues that crime labs should be governed by
a board consisting of a local prosecutor, a prominent defense
attorney, a representative from the public defender’s office,
a traditional scientist (nonforensic), and a forensic scientist
from a cross-jurisdictional laboratory. This governance structure seems likely increase the participation, voice, and consent
of at least some participants in the criminal justice system who
are underrepresented in FS today.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PRACTICE IN
THE FORENSIC SCIENCES
Leventhal’s analysis of procedural justice can be used as
a template for improving organizational processes and, therefore, organizational outcomes (see Cropanzano et al, 2007). The
results of this study can help those who conduct FS and those
who manage FS operations to better understand potential structural flaws and take steps to correct them, leading to a more just
and rigorous system. We have found deficiencies in FS under
each of Leventhal’s six criteria. We now examine organizational changes that might improve performance and outcomes
for each of Leventhal’s six criteria within FS. Table 1 summarizes our analysis. After this discussion of FS, we consider some
applications of our analysis for those outside that industry.
According to Leventhal’s first criterion, procedural justice
requires consistency of decision making. We have seen that
this criterion of procedural justice is violated by the reliance
on subjective judgment in each of the forensic-science disciplines, including fingerprint examination and DNA typing.
Further, subjective judgments can be influenced by extraneous
factors, which may lead to errors. To improve performance
and outcomes, FS should use objective protocols. For example,
Neumann et al. (2012) have proposed that fingerprint examiners
quantify the degree of similarity between prints using methods
“similar in principle to matching algorithms implemented in
the UK national fingerprint database known as Ident1” (p. 23).
Jonakait (1991) noted the importance of “established protocols” and the general lack of them in FS. The situation has
improved little since 1991: “Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic practice in a given discipline. And, even
when protocols are in place . . . they often are vague and not
enforced in any meaningful way” (NAS 2009, p. S-5). We also
call for the establishment of more objective protocols in FS.
Fortifying the defense right to expertise would create a kind
of competition between experts that would improve consistency
of decision making in FS. The prosecution and the defense
should have separate experts to help them understand the scientific evidence in a case. Unfortunately, as we previously
noted, the defense right to expertise recognized in Ake v.
Oklahoma “has not been effectively implemented” (Giannelli,
2004, p. 1419).
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TABLE 1
Summary of findings and recommendations
Procedural justice
criterion (Leventhal,
1980)

Forensic science procedure(s) in question

Identified potential solutions

1. Consistency of
decision making

• Reliance on subjective judgment in
forensic testing
• Single lab conducts test and interprets
results with limited opportunity for
outside opinions

• Increased use of externally sanctioned objective
protocols
• Expanding access to information to the defense
• Creating a process of competing experts each
testing and interpreting data

2. Freedom from bias

• Forensic science laboratories
administered by, report to, and are
dependent upon law enforcement
agencies, such as police departments,
for budgets, resources, and professional
advancement
• Context information from a case often
given to forensic scientists

• Reduce dependency of labs on law enforcement
agencies
• Sequential unmasking procedures: removal of
potentially biasing context information

3. Use of accurate
information

• Poor record keeping
• Destruction of evidence

• Standardized lab reports and protocols for
documentation and evidence handling
• Auditing and oversight by independent agencies
• Competing experts

4. Ability to correct
flawed decisions

• Twofold monopoly status of forensics
labs: a single lab conducts tests and
verifies own results
• Labs create own quality-control
procedures

• Competitive self-regulation: allowing other labs
to verify work
• Sending evidence to multiple labs for testing
and interpretation
• Establishing redundant testing systems

5. Conformity with
prevailing morals

• Labs responsible for verification
procedures
• “Verification shopping” to find evidence
confirming identifications
• Bias toward finding guilt

• Strengthen defense’s right to expertise and
evidence
• Establishing redundant testing systems
• Adjust ACE-V to require blind verification
• Competing experts as a means to balancing
biases

6. Consideration of the
opinions of those
affected by decisions

• Blocking of access to information to
other constituencies: public defenders,
defense attorneys, academics, etc.

• Independent governance board
• Greater openness and transparency

Competition between experts would improve consistency of
decision making in FS because any deviation from standard
protocols, or the absence of standard protocols, would be an
opening for the one side to point out limits and doubts attending the analysis of the other side. This exposure to criticism,
in turn, would nudge forensic scientists toward more objective
practices. And until such practices are adopted, jurors should be
given a greater opportunity to recognize both the strengths and
the weaknesses in FS testimony.
According to Leventhal’s second criterion, procedural
justice requires freedom from bias. We have seen that this

criterion of procedural justice is violated by organizing crime
labs under law enforcement. To improve performance and
outcomes, crime labs should be independent of law enforcement, and they should practice sequential unmasking. The
National Academies study calls for independence: “Forensic
scientists who sit administratively in law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ offices, or who are hired by those units, are
subject to a general risk of bias” (NAS 2009, p. 6-2).
Sequential unmasking is likely to be quite effective in
reducing the risk of bias-induced error. Forensic examiners
should not have access to potentially biasing information until
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after they have made the scientific decisions that might have
been biased by such information (Krane et al. 2008). In this
way, the examiner will not have the information required to act
in a biased manner.
According to Leventhal’s third criterion, procedural justice
requires the use of accurate information. We have seen that
this criterion of procedural justice is violated when crime labs
do not keep good records and when evidence is not preserved
properly. To improve performance and outcomes, crime labs
should adopt standardized lab reports and be better audited for
good recordkeeping. Increased oversight and auditing, either
by federal agencies or by private accrediting bodies (Risinger
et al., 2002: NAS, 2009: ASCLD, 2009; CLR, 2009), may also
provide improvement in FS process and outcomes.
According to Leventhal’s fourth criterion, procedural justice requires the ability to correct flawed decisions. We have
seen that this criterion of procedural justice is violated in FS
because of the twofold monopoly of examination and interpretation. Typically, one lab examines the evidence and interprets
the results of those examinations. To improve performance
and outcomes, forensic evidence should be subject to random
redundant examination, which Koppl (2005) calls “competitive
self-regulation.” A fraction of forensic evidence should be chosen at random and sent to, say, three labs for testing. If they
do not return consistent results, an inquiry would be required
to determine why. Redundancy of this sort would help us to
learn which labs are doing good work and which labs need to
improve. Redundant testing and “competitive self-regulation”
are the key proposals in Koppl’s (2005) integrated suite of proposed changes in FS. It is surprising that the straightforward
principle of redundancy (i.e., getting a second opinion) has not
been consistently or widely applied in FS.
According to Leventhal’s fifth criterion, procedural justice
requires conformity with prevailing morals. We have seen that
this criterion of procedural justice is violated when the procedures and biases of crime labs have the effect of substituting a
presumption of guilt for the moral presumption of innocence.
To improve performance and outcomes, ACE-V procedures
should be modified and the defense right to expertise should
be strengthened.
We have seen that ACE-V procedures require verification
only when an examiner thinks he or she has a match (an
“individualization”) and that they do not prohibit verification
shopping. Nor do they require that verifications be “blind,”
although blind verifications are encouraged. Thus, in the typical ACE-V verification the examiner doing the verification
knows what the “right” answer is and may be unconsciously
biased by that knowledge. Koppl (2010b) has examined the
consequences of requiring redundant fingerprint examinations
in felony cases. He finds that triplicate examinations for cases
going to trial would dramatically reduce the number of false
convictions caused by errors in fingerprint examinations while
lowering the costs of administering the criminal justice system,
through reduced appeals and unsuccessful prosecutions.

Strengthening the defense right to expertise would create a
forensic expert with an interest in interpreting the forensic evidence to exonerate the defendant. This bias would be a check on
the contrary bias often characterizing experts working for law
enforcement. This is an indirect strategy; rather than directly
eliminating the effective presumption of guilt often characterizing the practices of state crime labs, it creates a system of
checks and balances tending to push the overall system into
greater conformity with the moral requirement of a presumption
of innocence. One bias checks another.
Finally, according to Leventhal’s sixth criterion, procedural
justice requires consideration of the opinions of those affected
by decisions. We have seen that this criterion of procedural
justice is violated when defense attorneys and defense experts
are denied access to crime labs and government data sets.
It is also violated by the governance structure for most crime
labs, which is dominated by law enforcement. To improve
performance and outcomes, FS should adopt policies of greater
openness and the governance of crime labs should be opened to
a broader set of interests.
We are aware of no procedural or legal obstacles to greater
openness in FS. Such openness, however, might expose crime
labs to the risk of criticisms for possible errors, and such criticisms might threaten past and prospective convictions. Thus,
crime labs and law enforcement share an incentive to restrict
access and information. In the case of crime labs, changing the
governance structure to bring in a greater variety of interests or
stakeholders, such as the structure advocated by Cowan (2012),
could alter this incentive.

Applications for Practitioners Outside of Forensic
Sciences
Throughout our discussion of Leventhal’s criteria, we have
provided examples of how each criterion is often applied in typical business settings. Further, Copanzano et al. (2007) provide
excellent advice to managers in how all aspects of organizational justice can be built into such organizational processes
as performance evaluation, strategic planning, negotiation, and
employee selection. It is not our intent to repeat their advice
here. However, there are a few insights from our investigation
of FS that have not been previously emphasized in procedural
justice research.
One such insight is the importance of redundancy in
decision-making processes. In FS, we have seen the importance of having multiple labs and experts independently test and
interpret forensic evidence. Reducing any one actor’s monopoly
over decision making makes it more likely that errors can be
detected and addressed before decisions are made, and that
a broader set of stakeholders’ concerns may be addressed.
As redundancy is often seen as antithetical to efficiency, and
efficiency is valued in business, it is not surprising we do not see
more redundant decision-making practices. However, Koppl’s
(2005) recommendation for “competitive self-regulation” can
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be replicated in a wide range of businesses, and would probably
result in more careful and just decision-making processes.
One could implement redundancy by having two or more
task forces provide independent assessments of problems before
deciding on a course of action, having multiple independent
search committees evaluate executive job candidates, having
two independent groups conduct due diligence on prospective acquisition targets, and having more than one supervisor
conduct performance evaluations of employees. Much as independent auditing results in better accounting practice, redundant
decision-making processes throughout an organization should
result in better and more just processes. In each of these cases,
the benefits of redundancy would have to be weighed against its
costs. We suspect that the benefits may often have been underestimated, leading to less optimal redundancy. Redundancy may
be particularly useful in technical and scientific fields, and in
circumstances in which erroneous decisions can have significant
financial or human consequences.
A second insight from our analysis of FS is the recognition
that the structure of an organization or system can lead to subtle
and covert pressures that can bias decision making. In FS, we
noted how forensic labs are often embedded within and report
to law enforcement agencies and therefore are often dependent
upon them for budgets and other resources. This arrangement
can lead to subtle and often unconscious pressure to provide law
enforcement with the interpretations it is looking for, instead
of more objectively seeking the truth. Similar pressures operate
within any hierarchical system, including businesses.
By acting to reduce the role of politics and political behavior in an organizational culture, one can reduce the amount of
pressure middle managers may feel to making suboptimal decisions just to please a higher-up (Valle & Witt, 2001). Cowan’s
(2012) call for oversight by a board with diverse interests and
constituencies can be adapted to business. If middle managers
see themselves as responsible for addressing the needs of multiple constituencies (their boss, but also customers, coworkers,
other departments) they are less likely to be unduly influenced
by trying to please one particular superior. The same is true
for upper level managers reporting to a corporate board that
contains individuals who represent not just stockholders but
other important constituencies. Further, managers can reduce
conformity pressures among their employees by allowing for
safer environments to provide ideas, criticism, or dissenting
viewpoints, through such means as decision support systems,
anonymous employee suggestions, or secret balloting procedures (McFadzean, 1997).
Conclusion
Applied and industry-specific research is rare in organizational behavior (see Aguinis & Pierce, 2008; Cascio, 2008).
For example, while there has been more than 40 years of
organizational behavior research into procedural justice, to date,
none has been explicitly applied to FS. In fact, in two definitive works specifically aimed at examining past organizational
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justice research and looking to future directions (Colquitt,
Greenberg, & Scott, 2005; Greenberg, 1990), there is no mention of applying organizational justice in a variety of organizational and industry contexts and comparing the results and
efficacy of justice in those contexts. Industry-specific inquiry
in a variety of contexts can be a powerful method of investigating the generalizability, applicability, and limiting factors of
OB theories, and can bridge the all-too-common gap between
management theory and practice. OB scholarship would be
advanced if more of this type of research were published in
generalist journals.

NOTE
1. This article is part of the research program of the Institute for Forensic
Science Administration at Fairleigh Dickinson University (http://view.fdu.edu/
default.aspx?id=3959).
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